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Abstract— Digital forensic is part of forensic science that 
implicitly covers crime that is related to computer technology. 
In a cyber crime, digital evidence investigation requires a 
special procedures and techniques in order to be used and be 
accepted in court of law. Generally, the goals of these special 
processes are to identify the origin of the incident reported as 
well as maintaining the chain of custody so that the legal 
process can take its option. Subsequently, the traceability 
process has become a key or an important element of the digital 
investigation process, as it is capable to map the events of an 
incident from difference sources in obtaining evidence of an 
incident to be used for other auxiliary investigation aspects. 
Hence, this paper introduces a trace map model to illustrate the 
relationship in the digital forensic investigation process by 
adapting and integrating the traceability features. The objective 
of this integration is to provide the capability of trace and map 
the evidence to the sources and shows the link between the 
evidence, the entities and the sources involved in the process, 
particularly in the collection phase of digital forensic 
investigation framework. Additionally, the proposed model is 
expected to help the forensic investigator in obtaining accurate 
and complete evidence that can be further used in a court of law. 
Keywords— digital forensic investigation, traceability, trace 
map model, evidence, source of evidence 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, the number of crimes that involves 
computers has grown and it needs products that can assist 
law enforcement in using computer-based evidence to 
determine the who, what, where, when, and how for crimes 
[1]. As a result, computer and network forensics have 
evolved to assure proper presentation of computer crime 
evidentiary data into court. The main purpose of forensic is 
to identify the origin while maintaining the chain of custody 
in order to enable the legal process to take its due course [2]. 
If any computer related incident happens, fundamental 
questions to answer are when and where the incident 
occurred and, from which device, system and geographic 
location did the incident originate. Hence, there is a need in 
the forensic areas on investigation process in order to gather 
the evidence to be used on identifying the offender. A digital 
investigation is a process of answering questions about 
digital states and events. In contrast, a digital forensics 
investigation is a special case of digital investigation where 
the procedures and techniques used will allow the results to 
be entered into a court of law [3].  
The purpose of a forensic investigation can be established 
by either identifying the offender of a case, or establishing an 
evidence to build a case against the offender [4]. As both 
situations are common in the law enforcement perspective, 
the ability to trace the source to an evidence or vice versa is 
essential [5]. Additionally, another limitation is the 
acceptability of evidence that differs in each of these 
situations. There was also an issue of origin identification 
and cross referencing in investigation process [6] [7]. Hence, 
the traceability information is important to avoid the mislaid 
of decision and valuable information in collecting and 
analyzing during the investigation process.  
Due to this fact, the goal of this research is to adapt and 
integrate traceability in the digital forensic investigation 
process that represents the traceability information in the 
stage of conceptual and component composition. The 
purpose of this integration is to help the forensic investigator 
obtain accurate and complete evidence of the incident 
especially on evidence collection process. In this paper, the 
proposed model will be constructed based on the malware 
intrusion scenario. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next 
section explains the related work on traceability models. 
Section III further describes the use of traceability in digital 
forensic investigation. A trace map model is proposed in 
Section IV and a conclusion, together with future works is 
found in the last section.  
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Overview of Traceability 
Traceability is the means to identify and follow real or 
imaginary objects through a process chain [8]. It gives the 
opportunity to back-track a chain of events, or to predict 
process outcomes given in the origin of an object.  
Traceability can be used in different areas. For example, in 
the middle of 1990´s traceability was a hot subject when 
different cases of food-carried diseases were exposed. Even 
though traceability can also be defined in many ways, the 
meaning is to be able to trace or track and get information. 
ISO 8402:1995 defines traceability as the ability to trace the 
history, application or location of an entity, by means of 
recorded identifications. 
According to [9] the definition of traceability can be 
broad, because in most of the time the processes are very 
complex. Traceability is a tool to achieve different objective 
and can never be completed. On the other hand, [10] defined 
traceability as the ability to map events in cyberspace, 
particularly on the Internet, back to real-world instigators, 
often with a view to holding them accountable for their 
actions. In networks, traceability refers to how difficult it is 
to establish the source and destination of communications on 
computers and communication networks, such as the Internet 
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[11]. Therefore, based on the definition reviewed in this 
research, this paper summarized the definition of traceability 
as the ability to trace and map the events of an incident from 
difference sources in order to obtain evidence of an incident 
to be used for further process of investigation.  
The traceability approach is the approach used for tracing 
the requirement. According to [12], tracing the requirement 
can be performed in several ways based on the direction of 
tracing activities as depicted in Fig. 1.   
 Traceability Approach 
Forward Traceability Backward Traceability 
 
Fig. 1 Basic Traceability Approach 
In their paper, [13] define forward traceability as the 
ability to trace a requirement to components such as a design 
or implementation whereas backward traceability is the 
ability to trace requirement to its sources such as a person, 
institution, and argument. The basic concept of these 
traceability approaches are illustrated in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2 Concept of Backward and Forward Traceability  
Forward traceability approach is common in software 
requirements perspective. It is used to investigate the impact 
of the requirement’s change [12] [14].  In this approach, all 
related test procedures used to ensure the test procedures 
comply with the changed requirement and the components 
built to meet the requirement can be obtained. The advantage 
of this forward traceability is the ability to analyze the 
changes on the components. 
Backward traceability approach is used when the 
stakeholder is required to understand the changes happen 
such as when, what and how the requirement change by 
investigating the information used to describe the changed 
requirement. In this approach, several useful information that 
point toward to the source will be obtained such as who the 
person interested in the requirement is, what documents from 
which requirement was extracted are, which departments the 
requirement is related, and when the changes to the 
requirement is done. 
However, [14] [15] [16] claimed that in order to have a 
well managed requirements, traceability can be established 
from the source requirements to its lower level requirements 
and from the lower level requirements back to their source. 
The claim reveals that it is necessary to trace a requirement 
to the artifacts that implement it as well as tracing from an 
artifact to the requirement that the artifact itself implements. 
This circumstances create an idea on tracing in both a 
forward and backward or called as bidirectional approach as 
discussed in [17]. Hence in order to provide an accurate and 
complete evidence to prosecute the offender, this research 
will use the traceability approach discussed in [17]. To 
demonstrate the approach, knowledge of organizing the 
procedures, techniques and tools are needed. Identified as a 
traceability model, this knowledge is discussed in the next 
sub-section. 
B. Traceability Model 
A traceability model is a central component of a 
traceability environment around where the tracing 
procedures, techniques or methods, and tools are organized. 
It is important to automate any part of the tracing process 
[12]. An automation will reduce the time consume during the 
process. A traceability model not only defines what entities 
and traces are, and which traces should be captured , but also 
represents traceability information in the stage of conceptual 
design, component composition, deployment and runtime [18] 
[19] . However, based on [19] [18] [12], the traceability 
model is used to represent the traceability information which 
demonstrate the relationship between the traces , entities and 
sources involved in a process or system. 
In a traceability model, the conceptual explanation is 
covered by three features, namely the definition, the 
production and the extraction of traces [12] as shown in Fig. 
3. The definition feature is concerned with the specification 
of the traces and traceable objects. It is within this feature 
that traceability model should define its traces, attributes and 
represented method. The definition of traces and traceable 
objects should promote a uniform understanding in order to 
avoid any errors caused by different interpretation during the 
tracing activities. 
 Features of Traceability 
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Fig. 3 Features of Traceability Model 
The production feature is concerned with the capture of 
traces that is usually by the means of an explicit registration 
of the objects and their relationships. The trace production 
deals with the actual occurrence of traces that roughly 
corresponds to the pragmatics of a traceability model in order 
to get a constructive traceability model. The production of 
traces encompasses their perception, registration and 
maintenance. Besides, trace production is an important 
feature of traceability models because it can trace what 
component is available and it can interfere directly with the 
activities of the whole process. 
The extraction feature of the traceability model is 
concerned with the actual process of tracing such as the 
retrieval of registered traces. A traceability model should 
provide diverse and flexible ways to retrieve (extract) the 
information registered in it as discussed in [20]. Among the 
trace extraction mechanisms define in [20] are: (a) selective 
tracing, (b) interactive tracing and  (c) non-guided tracing. 
Selective tracing restricts the tracing to certain selected 
patterns of objects and relations. Interactive tracing allows 
interactive browsing over a set of related objects with each 
step being guided by the possible relationship. Non-guided 
tracing permits a user to go from one object to another and 
inspects contents as desired. 
Consequently, a traceability model should provide a 
representation for traces and trace attributes as discussed in 
[18] in which the trace model provide two significants 
guidelines; relationship guideline and tracing guideline.  The 
former guideline describes the relationship guidelines that 
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describes what traces should be established and the later 
guideline describes how traces determined by the 
relationship guidelines should be documented. Both 
guidelines establish the structures containing the elements 
and the relations used in tracing, specifying their type as well 
as the constraints under which elements of the model can be 
related.  
Hence, this research will employ all three features of the 
traceability model in our proposed trace map model for 
forensic in order to acquire accurate and complete evidence 
traces to help the forensic investigator on investigation 
process especially on collecting the evidence and the 
evidence sources of an incident. 
C. Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
In the digital forensics investigation practices, there are 
over hundreds of digital forensics investigation procedures 
developed all over the world. Each organization tends to 
develop its own procedures and some focused on the 
technology aspects such as data acquisition or data analysis 
[21]. Most of these procedures were developed for tackling 
different technology used in the inspected device. As a result, 
when underlying technology of the target device changes, 
new procedures have to be developed.  
A research done in [22] introduced a mapping process 
which occurs inside DFIF. The mapping is formulated by 
grouping and merging the same activities or processes in five 
phases that provide the same output into an appropriate phase. 
From the analysis, most of the frameworks consist of the 
critical phases which are Phase 2 – Collection and 
Preservation, Phase 3 – Examination and Analysis, and 
Phase 4 – Presentation and Reporting except Phase 1 and 
Phase 5. Even though, Phase 1 and Phase 5 are not included 
in some of the framework, the study [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] 
[28] [29] [30] [31] indicate that both phases are important to 
ensure the completeness of the investigation.  Phases 1 is to 
ensure the investigation process can start and run in the 
proper procedure, and protect the chain of custody of the 
evidence. While by eliminating Phase 5, it will lead to the 
possibility of the incomplete investigation and no 
improvement in investigation procedures or policies. 
Therefore, a good framework should consist of all important 
phases; Preparation Phase, Collection and Preservation Phase, 
Examination and Analysis Phase, Presentation and Reporting, 
and Disseminating the case. 
[22] findings also show that the existing frameworks 
mentioned in each of the proposed frameworks builds on the 
experience of the previous; and some of the frameworks have 
similar approaches and some of the frameworks focus on 
different areas of the investigation. However, all of the 
frameworks in the output mapping have the same output 
even though the activity is slightly difference on the term 
used and the order of the steps. On the other hand, all of 
these frameworks identified in the output mapping show that 
each framework has their own strength; however until 
nowadays there is no single framework that can be used as a 
general guideline for investigating all incident cases.  
Therefore, in order to obtain the evidence and for it to be 
accepted in the court of law, digital forensic investigation 
must be successfully performed without tampering the 
evidence. Additionally, the evidence chain of custody should 
be presented to prove the evidence is legitimate. Hence, the 
evidence traceability identification of the origin of the crime 
scene or the location of the incident or crime originated is 
one of the important elements during the digital forensic 
investigation process and become the first challenge in the 
investigation as mentioned in [7] [32] [33].  
III. TRACEABILITY IN DIGITAL FORENSIC INVESTIGATION 
PROCESS 
In digital forensic investigation process, tracing is 
described as a process of finding or discovering the origin or 
cause of certain scenario. The tracing activities are able to 
discover the traces left in digital devices. In the computer 
crime perspective, trace can be found in any digital devices. 
These traces consist of activities such as login and logout of 
the system, visit of pages, accesses documents, create items 
and affiliation groups found in records of data. These traces 
data are analysed by identifying their relationship among the 
attributes such as port, action, protocol, source IP address 
and destination IP address where this consistent relationship 
will produce trace pattern of the incident or crime. This trace 
pattern can be further used on assisting the investigator 
during the investigation process. 
A. Trace Pattern 
Trace pattern is essential in assisting the investigators 
tracing out the evidence found at crime scenes [34]. In this 
research, we affirm the definition of trace as any digital 
evidence in an incident. Meanwhile, tracing is defined as the 
observation of the moving trace on the various tracks. In 
addition, pattern is defined as a regular way in which certain 
scenario happened [35]. Therefore, in order to get a trace 
pattern, the observed movement of these trace is studied to 
confirm its regular way, with the help of the acquired 
hypothesis. 
The trace pattern is confirmed using two steps. Firstly, 
the hypothesis which explains the initial scenario of the 
incident is taken. Secondly, the trace which was recorded in 
the source of evidence (host and network logs) is formulated. 
Using these two, the movement is observed which conclude 
that within the source of evidence, there are three courses of 
action that occurred. This course of action is referred as an 
event instead of process due to their focuses. A process 
merely focuses on progress or series of action toward a 
particular result; whereas, an event focus on the occurrence 
of something which not only concern with its action, but also 
with the attributes associated with it [36]. 
The extraction of the two steps above derives the three 
events of incident which are scan, exploit and impact/effect. 
Scan consists of the inspection activity which are not only to 
find vulnerability, but also to determine any available 
services (e.g. port number) on the target system (system 
being attacked) [37]. In this activity, if the port number 
responds to a scan, it will indicate the type of service running 
on the target system and reveal the exploitable services to 
attackers. Therefore, once the system determined which 
services are running on it, the vulnerability of the system 
could be exploited. Eventually, these exploited vulnerability 
can become a threat, such as unauthorized access (gain 
access) or unavailable service for intended users (deny 
service). 
Exploit consists of the abuse activity traces that disclose 
any manipulation activity on the target system services such 
as attempting on downloading malicious codes to the target 
system and breaking the target system for opening backdoor 
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on specific port.  Meanwhile, the impact/effect event shows 
the traces on the goal of an attack which shows the goal of an 
attack as the consequences of the scan and exploits activities 
of the incident such as the target system is restarted, the 
services are terminated (expectedly) and new process is 
forced to be created. 
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Fig. 8 Event-based Forensic Trace Map 
In this research, the combination of the three events 
discussed previously form different trace patterns in order to 
identify the offender of the incident: victim, attacker and 
victim/attacker. As this pattern reflects the complainer or 
perspective, henceforth, it is named as Perspective Trace 
Pattern. From the analysis and findings in [34], 
victim/attacker and victim perspective trace pattern must 
consists of all three events, and attacker perspective trace 
pattern must consist of scan and exploit events of incident 
but it is optional in having the impact/effect event as depicted 
in Fig. 8. However, the difference between them is the 
content of the attributes belongs to each of the events such as 
the number of the destination port open, the type of operation, 
the protocol of the connection request, the services that are 
vulnerable and the item transferred during the 
communication exist. 
The attributes of scan are communication exist, 
destination port open, operation type and connection request.  
Conversely, the attributes of exploit event are similar to scan 
event, with an addition of vulnerable service attribute. 
Nevertheless, the attributes of impact/effect are 
communication exists, new process creates, malicious code 
transferred as well as service terminated. The general 
summary of the traces of the event of the incident is 
illustrated in Fig. 9(a), Fig. 9(b) and Fig. 9(c) respectively. 
  
Fig. 9(a) Traces Attributes of Scan 
Event 
Fig. 9(a) Traces Attributes of Exploit 
Event 
 
Fig. 9(a) Traces Attributes of Exploit Event 
For the purpose of this paper, in explaining perspective 
trace pattern, let’s consider an incident that was caused by a 
worm, Blaster. Based on the logs (host and networks), the 
traces of scan event shows the attribute of communication 
exist between the victim and attacker via Destination IP 
Address and Source IP Address respectively. Next, the 
destination port open responded is port 135 and the operation 
type (action) is OPEN-INBOUND (traffic is allowed in), 
whereas the connection request (protocol) is TCP (traffic 
packet is transmitted). The success of this event leads to the 
next event, exploit. In this event, the action continues with 
destination port open responded is 4444 and 69. If the port 
4444 is exploited, the operation type (action) is OPEN-
INBOUND and the connection request is TCP, then partial 
exploit is in place. Port 69 is also exploitable. If port 69 is 
exploited, the operation type (action) is OPEN (in/out 
communication is allowed) and the connection request is 
UDP (file is transmitted) which leads to vulnerable service 
(service) as TFTP (file transfer occurred). We consider the 
exploit is successful if both ports above are exploited. As the 
consequences of the scan and exploit event, the impact/effect 
incident occurred. This event consists of few attributes 
namely; a) offender identified (who is victim and attacker), b) 
a process created (traffic action) which reside 
at %WINDIR%\System32\tftp.exe, c) the service terminated 
is RPC, and d) malicious code transferred (file transmitted) 
is %WINDIR%\System32\msblast.exe. The above example 
describes that the traces belong to victim trace pattern. The 
example can also be represented as an algorithm depicted in 
Table 3. 
TABLE 1 VICTIM TRACE PATTERN ALGORITHM 
Victim Trace Pattern 
Event Name: Scan 
Attribute:-  
    Communication Exist   := Source IP Address, 
                             Destination IP Address 
    Destination Port Open := 135 
    Operation Type        := OPEN-INBOUND 
    Connection Request    := TCP 
Action  :- find_vulnerability( ); 
           determine_services( ); 
Event Name: Exploit 
Attribute:-  
     Communication Exist   := Source IP Address, 
                              Destination IP Address 
     Destination Port Open := 4444 || 69 
     Operation Type        := OPEN-INBOUND || OPEN 
     Connection Request    := TCP || UDP 
     Vulnerable Services   := TFTP (4444 && 69) 
Action  :- scan( ); 
           show_manipulation_activity( ); 
Event Name: Impact/effect 
Attribute:-  
    Offender Identified         := victim 
    New Process Created         := %WINDIR%\System32\tftp.exe 
    Malicious Codes Transferred := %WINDIR%\System32\msblast.exe 
    Service Terminated          := RPC 
Action  :- exploit( ); 
           show_impact( ); 
 
B. Integration of Traceability Features and Digital Forensic 
Investigation Process 
In order to provide the capability of tracing and mapping 
the accurate and complete evidence in digital forensic 
investigation process, the relationship between each trace 
should be identified to form the incident trace pattern. In this 
research, the ways for identifying this relationship is 
accomplished using features in traceability approach 
(definition, production and extraction) discussed previously. 
The integration of the traceability model’s features (TMF) in 
digital forensic investigation process (DFIP) is illustrated in 
Table 1. 
In Table 1, TMF in DFIP indicate that there is a potential 
in implementing traceability features in forensic 
investigation process. As mentioned by [7] [2], traceability is 
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an important element in forensic investigation process and it 
is related to the link element which is the key element used 
to form evidence’s chain of custody.  It is impossible to 
prevent all internet misuse but it is not impossible to identify 
and trace the evidence, and then take appropriate action.  
TABLE 2 THE INTEGRATION OF TMF AND DFIP 
Feature  TMF TMF in DFIP 
Definition: 
related to the specification of the 
traces and traceable objects 
identify traces, 
attributes 
identify component in incident 
Production: 
related to the capture of traces 
(relationships) 
perception, 
registration and 
maintenance 
hypothesis, identify forward and 
backward traceability, 
preservation of evidence 
Extraction: 
related to the actual process of 
tracing 
trace extraction 
mechanism 
tracing the evidence using 
selective tracing to promote 
trace pattern 
 
Therefore, without the traceability information, the 
investigation decisions and other valuable information for 
collecting and analysing the evidence could be mislaid. 
Hence, a traceability approach is necessary and in this 
research, the proposed integration is named as trace map 
model. 
C. Proposed Trace Map Model 
The trace map model proposed is based on work done in 
[34]. This model is uses event-based traceability technique 
which was motivated from the traceability model discussed 
in [38]. Ramesh introduced three components: stakeholder, 
subject and object as depicted in Fig. 4.  
 
trace to 
documents 
has role in 
manages 
STAKEHOLDER 
OBJECT SOURCE 
 
Fig. 4 Traceability Model [38] 
In this model, the stakeholder represents people who have 
an interest on requirements and on the tracing of 
requirements, the source represents the origins of a 
requirement and the artifacts used for documentation 
purposes, and the object represents the inputs and outputs 
being traced. In Fig. 4, the model represents what type of 
information is presented including salient attributes or 
characteristics of the information which is referred as object. 
For example, this information can be represented as an 
attribute of object and the traceability across various object is 
represented by a link namely traces to. The model also 
shows the stakeholders are the people who play different 
roles in the creation, maintenance and use the various objects 
and traceability links across them. These stakeholders act in 
different roles or capacities in the establishment and use the 
various conceptual object and traceability links. The subject 
represents the location of the documented traceability 
information i.e. which state that all objects are documented 
by subjects.  
In Ramesh’s model, the various dimension of traceability 
information is discussed such as what kind of information is 
represented, who are the people that play the role, where and 
how the traceability information are represented, why and 
where the object are created, modified and evolved. The 
compatibility and the capability model also have been 
discussed in various business areas with different traceability 
focus. In this research, this model is adapted and integrated 
within the digital forensic investigation process which 
consists of three components, namely stakeholder, source of 
evidence and digital evidence as shown in Fig. 5.  
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Fig 5 Conceptual Diagram of Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
These components map to the components in Ramesh’s 
model: stakeholder, subject and object respectively. 
Stakeholders refer to the people involve in the whole process 
of digital forensic investigation such as the auditor, network 
administrator, complainer (perspective as discussed in [34]) 
and forensic expert. In this research, these investigators will 
manage the source of evidence on the incident reported such 
as the devices (host and network) and the logs involved in 
the incident. Meanwhile, the digital evidence is defined as 
events of incident (see subsection Trace Pattern) that are 
documented in the source of evidence. This current 
relationship is further illustrated using the diagram in Fig. 6. 
For the purpose of this research, the domain selected is 
malware intrusion incident. 
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Fig.6 Trace Map Model 
As illustrated in Fig. 6, the process of investigation is 
initializes when a complainer complains or reports the 
incident to the investigator (administrator and/or forensic 
investigator). Then, the process is continued by searching the 
relevance potential evidence based on the preliminary 
information reported by the complainer. The evidence is 
collected from the source of evidence: host and network that 
derive heterogenous log. Subsequently, a hypothesis (an 
assumption made to test the logical or empirical 
consequences) is formulated in order to trace the event of the 
incident. The traces of event gathered then are map to 
construct the perspective’s trace pattern.  
Based on the proposed trace map model, the investigator 
could trace and map the traces of the incident that are used as 
the digital evidence of the incident. In this model, the traces 
of the offender are based on the primary events of incident 
that scan, exploit and impact/effect. In each event of incident, 
the trace patterns of the perspectives (victim, attacker, multi-
step attacker) are established. The model also helps the 
investigator identifying the relationship between the source 
of evidence, the digital evidence and the people involve 
during the investigation process. Hence, this model will help 
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the investigator on identifying the source of evidence in 
order to provide a complete and accurate digital evidence of 
the incident reported. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Traceability is an important element in forensic 
investigation process and related to the link element which is 
the key element used in forming evidence’s chain of custody. 
To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, unfortunately, 
most of research on traceability has been concentrating on 
software engineering, manufacturing, food processing etc. 
but not in digital investigation areas. Therefore, this research 
introduced a trace map model, inspired from traceability 
model. The proposed model is used to provide the forensic 
investigation the ability to trace back the digital evidence and 
source of evidence during the forensic investigation process 
specifically in collection and preservation phase of digital 
forensic investigation framework.  
This useability is based on the preliminary assessment 
through the case study as presented in this paper. It also 
shows that the trace pattern enables us to identify the origin 
of malware intrusion through the traces attributes. These 
assist the investigator to show the relationship of the incident 
traces during obtaining the evidence accuracy and 
completeness in order to enable the legal process to take its 
due course. In future, the effectiveness of the evidence 
tracing is evaluated through a validation process. It is 
foreseeable to develop a prototype that can be used as one of 
the forensic investigation tool through this proposed trace 
map model. 
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